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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
-v-

Case No. 19275

TIMMY HILL,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellant was charged with and convicted of Theft by
Deception, a second-degree felony, in violation of Utah Code
Ann.

§

76-6-405 (1978).

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Appellant was tried before a jury and found guilty
of Theft by Deception on 28 April, 1983 in the Second Judicial
District Court for Weber County, State of Utah, the Honorable
John F. Wahlquist presiding.

On 31 May 1983, the trial court

sentenced appellant to an indeterminate term of not less than
one year nor more than fifteen years.

On 19 July 1983, the

trial court ordered appellant's release from the Utah State
Prison pending disposition of this appeal.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks a judgment and order of this court
affirming the jury verdict and sentence of the lower court.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On 10 December 1Q82, Jack Alexander, an Ogden Citv
policeman on special assignment with the State of Utah
Narcotic and Liguor La11 Enforcement Bureau, and Frank, nn
informer, met with appellant, Timmy Hill,

to arrange for the

purchase of an ounce of cocaine (T. 66-71, 101, 116-117, 169).
Detective Alexander had been introduced to Timmy Hill by
Carolina Jones (T.

5, lQ, 35, llS).

Appellant and Detective

Alexander settled on the price of $2100 for an ounce of
cocaine and agreed to meet at Carolina's house later that
afternoon (T. 71, 117, 135).
Detective Alexander arrived at Carolina's house
before appellant.

When appellant arrived, he said he did not

have the cocaine with him then, hut asked to see Detective
Alexander's money (T. 49, 79, 91, 93, 118-121).

Appellant

said he would return with the cocaine later in the afternoon,
and told Detective Alexander to listen for a car's horn and to
walk out to the car when he heard it (T. 80, 94, 52).
After the second meeting, appellant drove to a
nearby store and obtained a box of baking soda and a "Big
Nickel" newspaper with which he fasioned a package of white
powder that resembled a package of cocaine (T. 119, 139).
Appellant returned to Carolina's house about 5:20 that
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afternoon (T. 21, 80).

Detective Alexander went out to the

car and sat in the back seat (T. 83).
front passenger seat (T. 22, 140).

Appellant sat in the

Detective Alexanner asked

appellant if he had the cocaine and appellant responded in the
affirmative (T. 81).

Appellant openen the package he had

fashionen, showed it to Detective Alexander and assuren him
that the purporten cocaine was good stuff, but nid not let
Detective Alexander test it (T. 52, 84, 97, 104, 119-120).
Appellant tole'! Detective Alexander that the price was $211)0
(T. 84).

He took the $2100 Detective Alexander handed to him

(T. 84, 86, 99) and gave Detective Alexander the purported
cocaine (T. 120).

After receiving the money, appellant

apparently placen it on the console between the car's bucket
seats ( T. 23, 24, 8'!, 120).

When the sale was completed,

Detective Alexander signaled to other officers waiting nearby,
and appellant was arrested (T. 84).

Upon being arrested,

appellant told the officers, "That's okay, that's okay.

You

ain't got shit on me, check the stuff out, sucker." (T. 87,
100).

The purported cocaine appellant sold to Detective

Alexander proved to be the baking soda appellant had purchased
earlier in the afternoon (T. "34, 109).
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
APPELLANT WAS PROPERLY CHARGED AND
CONVICTED OF THEFT BY DECEPTION BECAUSE
THE IMITATION CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES ACT
PROVISION PROSCRIBING DISTRIBUTION OF
IMITATION CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES OOES NOT
APPLY TO THE FACTS OF THIS CASE.
Appellant contends that he was improperly convicted
of Theft by Deception under Utah Code Ann.

~

76-6-405 (1978),

because his conduct was more specifically proscribed by Utah
Code Ann.

~

58-37b-4 (1983 Interim Supp.), Distribution of an

Imitation Controlled Substance.

Appellant relies on Hulmuth

v. Morris, Utah, 598 P.2rl 333, 335 (1979) and State v.
Shondell, 22 Utah 2d 343, 453 P.2d 146, 148 (1969) for the
principle that where a defendant's conduct may be consinered
to fall within the purview of two separate statutes, the
statute which applies more specifically to the defendant's
conduct takes precedence, and the rule that "where two
statutes interdict the same conduct, but impose different
penalties, the violator is entitled to the lesser punishment."
Helmuth at 335 (footnote omitted).
"The fallacy in • • •

[appellant's] argument is

that the statute referred to does not prohibit the same
conduct" as does

§

76-6-405.

Id.

(1983 Interim Supp.) states:
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Utah Code Ann. ~ 58-37b-4

It is unlawful for any person to
manufacture, distribute, or possess with
intent to distribute, an imitation
controlled substance.
Any person who
violates this section shall he guilty of a
class B misdemeanor and upon conviction
may be imprisoned for a term not exceeding
six months, fined not more than 5299, or
both.
The Utah statute is nearly identical to Section 2.a. of the
Model Imitation Controlled Substances Act (1981).
As defined by Utah Code Ann.

~

5A-37b-2(4), an

"imitation controlled substance" is
• . a substance that is not a controlled
substance, which by overall dosage unit
substantially resembles a specific
controlled substance in appearance (such
as color, shape, size and markings), or by
representations made, would cause a
reasonable person to believe that the
substance is a controlled substance.
Baking soda, the substance appellant sold to the undercover
agent, is not an "imitation controlled substance"

according

to the Imitation Controlled Substances Act, and therefore, the
Act does not proscribe appellant's conduct.

The reasons for

this become apparent upon examination of the Model Imitation
Controlled Substances Act (1981).

That act is designed to

control the manufacture, distribution and use of "look-alike"
drugs.
LOok-alikes are tablets and capsules which
are manufactured and imprinted to closely
resemble or even duplicate the appearnce
of well-known, brand name controlled
substances, but which contain only
non-controlled over-the-counter durgs such
as caffeine, ephedrine,
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phenylpropanolamine, actaminophen, or some
combination of these substances.
Look-alikes are advertised as being body
stimulants, alternative energy sources, or
nighttime analgesics.
Prefatory Note, Model Imitation Controlled Substances Act
(1981).

In addition to tablets and capsules, powder,

and liquids may sometimes be "look-alike" drugs and thus
"imitation controlled substances."
The portion of the DEA Model Act which
deals with "representations made: by the
seller[,<; 58-37b-1 of the Utah Act,] is
not really intended to reach look-alikes
in tablet or capsule form, but rather, is
intended to reach those cases where powder
or liquid is represented to be controlled
substances.
Comment, Model Imitation Controlled Substances Act (1981).
However, not all powders or liquids sold as substitutes for
controlled substances are "imitation controlled substances."
DEA believes that many of the existing and
draft State Acts which have sought to
reach the look-alike problem have placed
too much emphasis on the representations
made by the seller of the substances.
Hence, the DEA Model Act seeks to place
emphasis on the "look-alike" nature of
most of the substances involved to sustain
the burden of proving a violation.
(Emphasis added.)
Comment, Model Imitation Controlled Substances Act (1981).
The gravamen of the "look-alike nature" of "imitation
controlled substances," including powders and liquids,
according to the Prefatory Note of the Model Act,
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is that the

subs ta nee "resemble or • .

• duplicate the appearance of

well-known controlled substances," but most contain, instead
of the controlled substance, any one or a combination of
non-controlled over-the-counter drugs, usually

stimulants or

rippetite supressants .
• . [T]he look-alike ingredients have a
legitimate medical use, they are found i~
many of the more common over-the-counter
products and when used as nirected, they
are generally not harmful.
prefatory Note, Model Imitation Controlled Substances Act
(1981).

The baking soda soln in this case was not a substance

which, when ingested, would cause the consumer to experience
and effect similar to but less severe than the effect of the
controlled substance it was "manufactured" (§ 58-378-2(3)) to
imitate.

Thus,

it was not within the intent nor scope of the

statute.

A contrasting example is that of a tablet or capsule

containing caffeine which is manufactured to resemble a
controlled substance such as an amphetamine.

Similarly, if

the substitute substance appellant sold to the undercover
agent had been composed of a white powder containing, in part,
caffeine or ephedrine, then the baking soda wouln have been an
"imitation controlled substance."
The problems at which the Imitation Controlled
Substance Act is aimed are described in the Prefatory Note to
the Moclel Act as follows:
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Look-alikes are touted as being completely
safe and legal and consumers are advised
to take several in order to get the full
effect.
Of course, the danger to a child
who has been inqesting five or six
caffeine pills and attempts the same thing
with real amphetamines one day is obvious.
More insidious is the grwoing climate of
acceptance of these substances among
students as their sale and use become
widespead.
Of immediate concern, however,
are recent reports of hospital emergencies
and even overdose deaths caused solely by
ingestion of look-alikes.
Prefatory Note, Model Imitation Controlled Substances Act
( 1981).

Appellant's content ion that the Imitation Controllerl

Substances Act, by statutory language, universally governs all
conduct involving imitation controlled substances is
unfounded.

When read in conjunction with the Prefatory Note

and Comment, the Act clearly specifies what kinds of
substances it governs, and simple baking soda, under the facts
of this case, falls outside the scope of the act.
The Imitation Controlled Substances Act also clearly
specifies what conduct it proscribes.

Contrary to appellant's

conclusion, there is no express or implied reference in
~

58-37b-4 to the act of selling substances to unknowing

buyers with the intent to deceptively steal their money.

This

specific intent requirement is, however, found in the Theft hy
Deception statute which states in pertinent part:
(1) A person commits theft if he obtains
money or exercises control over property
of another by deception and with a purpose
to deprive him thereof.
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Utah Code Ann.

~

76-6-405 (1978).

Thus, because the baking soda is not an "imitation
controlled substance" as contemplated by the Imitation
G1ntrolled Substances Act, and because appellant's conduct
does not fall within the scope of the Act, ~ 58-37b-4 does not
provide a more specific interdiction of appellant's conduct.
Section 58-37b-4 simply does not apply to appellant's conduct,
and therefore, no conflict exist between ~ 58-37b-4 and ~
76-6-405 under the facts of this case.
Absent any conflict between the statutes appellant
discusses, this Court need not address the question of whether
Utah Code Ann. ~ 58-37-19 (1953) would be applicable to the
Imitation Controlled Substances Act, the later enacted
subchapter of the Controlled Substances Act (Utah Code Ann.
~

58-37-1 et seq.

(1953) ).

Utah Code Ann.

~

58-37-19 (1953)

provides as follows:
It is the purpose of this act to regulate
and control the substances designated
within section 58-37-4, and whenever the
requirements prescribed, the offenses
defined or the penalties imposed relating
to substances controlled by this act shall
be or appear to be in conflict with Title
58, Chapter 17 or any other laws of this
state, the provisions of this act shall be
controlling.
(Emphasis added.)
Section 58-37-19 does not prohibit the use of provisions found
elsewhere in the Utah Code in all cases.

Only when the use of

external provisions creates a conflict with the Controlled
Substances Act are the external provisions superseded.
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In the

instant case, the statute uncler which appellant seeks a lessPr
sentence does not apply to his conduct, and therefore, it is
not in conflict with the statute uncler which appellant was
appropriately charged, convicted, and sentencecl.
The gravamen of appellant's arpeal

is that becausr·

his conduct is more specifically clef inecl and proscribed by
~

58-37b-4, that statute is controlling, ancl therefore, he was

improperly charged under

§

76-6-405.

Appellant's argument

fails because the statute he refers to cloes not aprly to his
conduct.

Therefore, appellant's the conviction ancl sentence

must be affirmed.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, respond requests that
this Court affirm the conviction and sentence for Theft hy
Deception.
RESPECTFULLY submitted th is ;<s-:;ay of November,
19 83.
DAVID L. WILKINSON
Attorney General

·/?7~
General

-10-

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and exact copy
of the foregoing Brief of Respondent, postage prepaid, to JOhn
T. Caine and Bernald L. Allen, Attorneys for Appellant, 2568
washing ton Boulevard, Ogden, Utah 84401, this ~day of
November, 1983.

